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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 930799-CA
Priority No. 2

v.
DOUGLAS J. TUELLER,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of theft from a
person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§
76-6-404 & -412 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly determine that no

discovery violation had occurred which would justify the
exclusion of Investigator Miller's testimony?

A trial court's

determination of what materials fall within the scope of a
discovery request is a conclusion of law which is accorded no
deference on appeal.
App. 1993).

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472 (Utah

However, the court's determination that disclosure

was made is a question of fact which must be affirmed unless
clearly erroneous.
(Utah 1993).

See State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1243

Whether a question of law or fact, "an error based

on nondisclosure by the prosecution warrants reversal 'only if a

review of the record persuades the [appellate] court that without
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant.'"
omitted).

Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations

Accord State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918-19 (Utah

1987).
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion for new trial based on defendant's allegations that the
prosecutor failed to disclose discovery materials and elicited
false testimony?
A denial of a motion for a new trial is "within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed
absent a clear abuse of that discretion."

State v. Williams, 712

P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following rules, in pertinent part, are
determinative of this case:
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information
of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements
of the defendant or codefendant;
(2) the criminal record of defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized rom the
defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate
the guilty of the defendant, or mitigate the
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown should be
made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as

2

soon as practicable following the filing of charges and
before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying
the opposing party that material and information may be
inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable
times and places.
• • •

(g) If at any time during the course of the
proceedings its is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule,
the court may order such party to permit the discovery
or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it
may enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24.
new trial.

Motion for

(a) The court may, upon motion of a
party or upon its own initiative, grant a new
trial in the interest of justice if there is
any error or impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of
a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential
facts in support of the motion. If additional time is
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court
may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as
it deems reasonable.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30.
Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By amended information, defendant was charged with
theft from a person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 & -412 (1990) (R. 6-7).

3

Trial occurred on

April 12-14, 1993, resulting in a jury verdict of guilty as
charged (R. 95-99, 124-25, 127). On May 21, 1993, the court
sentenced defendant to the statutory term of imprisonment and
maximum statutory fine.

The court then stayed the sentence and

placed defendant on probation for three years under specified
terms and conditions (R. 130-31).
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion for new trial
which was denied (R. 153-54, 169; Supp. Record, Order dated Nov.
30, 1993).

Defendant timely appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Introduction

At trial, defendant did not dispute that he stole
concert tickets belonging to Krista Warberg but claimed that his
criminal acts only supported a jury finding of misdemeanor theft
and not felony theft from a person (T. 283-84).

On appeal,

defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his felony conviction.
Instead, he alleges prosecutorial misconduct: the
prosecutor failed to provide the defense with Investigator
Miller's notes and tape of an interview with defense witness Matt
Despain and failed to correct Miller's testimony that no such
notes or tape existed.

Defendant argues that this alleged

misconduct entitles him to a new trial because but for
Investigator Miller's testimony on rebuttal concerning the
Despain interview, the outcome of his trial would have been more
favorable.

Since analysis of defendant's claim of prejudice
4

necessarily

i n v o l v e s a review of the trial e v i d e n c e ,

f o] 1 o w i n g statemenr

fact is ;i y-\ nuhm i. tt cnil ,

of

85 0' P. 2d at 124 3; State v . Knight, 73 4 i\2d

the

State v,

at 918 19,

The recitation of facts is in the light most
I"-11 II" I'll1)'"

•T-rdw I ,

Archuleta,

favorable

State v . Hamilton,, H27 p , 2 d 2 3 2 , 233-34

(Utah 1 9 9 2 ) .
Trial Testimony
•

Garth Hronks-i' concerts sell nut i|iiickly; fans must wait

hours t o p u r c h a s e tickets

(T

66-68)

As d result,

"scalpers"

s o m e t i m e s purchase t i c k e t s only to resell t:. hern for amounts
K"1 f*-A11\ upoiiSOTS

substail 1; ia 1 Iy above I"ace < >ra"1 ue

control scalping but, in Utah, i.f is not illegal

announced tickets w e r e available :•:..••
scheduled for J une

(T

63, 6 6 ) .

:

^i

a\\f empt to
I "', 2 7

°,

B r o o k s concert

Hopeful ticket

purchasers

descended o n the event c
A m o n g t h e fans w a s K r i s t a W a r b e r g
friend's brother, Steve Moul*wait in i i n e ici
ticket

(id.) .

Kri^: , :• • i -

• - agreed that

• K n - v * vv-_-

t"te. ve , w 1 Ii> •

(T. 6 5 - 6 7 ) ,
Krlsla a c t t o the Delta Center around

the d a y before

.

b o x office wai

e

w a i t e d all d a y . W h e n night fell, h e r friend, D i a n e M o u l t o n ,
j' :::: :i ne> ::i h sx and they c * »ed o u t ±n i
as not to ] ose thei i ; . ^ ° n'n ^'rie

5

....

*

;ie

ticket o f f i c e so

^e next d a y a f t e r

Krista had stood in line twenty-four hours, Steve relieved her.
He eventually purchased several tickets for himself, his family
including Diane, and the ticket for Krista (T. 67-68) .
Not all fans were willing to stand in line for tickets.
Bob Miller, defendant's Softball couch, asked defendant if he
could use his insider-connections to get tickets (T. 154-55).
Defendant knew some current employees of the Delta Center from
his prior employment as a security guard at the Salt Palace (T.
20-21, 155, 207). Defendant telephoned Laura Russell, a Delta
Center administrative assistance, to see if she would put aside
some tickets for him (T. 155, 207). Laura explained that while
she had previously been able to get defendant tickets when she
was employed at the Salt Palace, the Delta Center's policy
prohibited employees from purchasing tickets either for
themselves or others (T. 208, 210-11).

Because of the

restriction, Laura told defendant that she "couldn't get him any
tickets" (T. idL, 209).
Defendant did nothing further during the next days to
obtain tickets (T. 156).
June 6th arrived, the day of the Brooks' concert.
Despite Laura Russell's previous explanation that Delta Center
employees could not purchase tickets, defendant called another
former Salt Palace employee, Bradford Freckleton, who was now the
Delta security manager (T. 21-22) . Bradford recalled that
defendant first called sometime before noon and
indicated that, of course, the desire to go
to the show, but had discussed with me
6

[Bradford] that he had made some prior
arrangements to get tickets through a Laura
Russell that worked in our ticket lobby. I
indicated that, you know, I - - I was not
aware of that, that I was going -- you know,
I'd have to check with Laura, as far as what
the?, tickets were, because I believe she was
on vacatic 11 at the time.

Defendant cal led Bradford back around l.wJ W-L ~.„~ ^.z...
frr

23)

Bradford told defendant ;.
no one ii i the ticket lobby or ticket office
had indicated that, you know, that Laura had
done anything and that there was no tickets
left. Again, I [Bradford] indicated that
there was nothing that had been released1 up
[sic] at that time. There was talk that
there was going to be release of seats that
was going to take place later that day, and I
indicated that he was welcome to come up and
stand in line with the other people that are
getting tickets, but there was no way that I
could actually pull our security tickets for
him.
jeu m m

:•>:•?:?. defendant, who worked
- - ••-'- ^- —

--':.'-• r iv^P' :-

^
'

ontinental Airlines, could
Bradford told him that he

.;- getting i:-,u^-; u,e concert was scheduled for 7:30
!"T ii'i) .

According to defendant, his coach and the coach's

- .i,.^ w e r e Wiiil ]i„ii«'i I if I h •" J HI iint. I c a ^ n r e d t ii R e t s

' "ln

(,,,s

*tba"M

diamond where one oi their games was being played
Defendant and his friend, Matt Despain, were suppose .. ... at the
1

For some events, tickets are held back from the initial
public sale and then "released" for sale shortly before the event.
Fans sti 11 must wait in line to purchase these released tickets
(T. 48)

7

game (T. 122-23, 126). Instead, defendant told Despain that he
had to drive to the Delta Center to "get some tickets" (T. 123).
On the way, defendant asked if he could borrow some money since
he had none with him; Despain agreed (T. 137, 179).
Defendant and Despain arrived at the Delta Center
around 6:00 or 6:30 p.m. (T. 48-49, 60-61, 68, 101, 123, 190).
Despain stayed in the car while defendant went inside (T. 123).
At the ticket window, defendant told the saleswoman
that he had tickets on will-call under his name; she searched but
there were none (T. 45). Defendant then insisted that the
tickets were under Brad Freckleton's name; again, there were none
(id.).

Defendant became "very agitated" and "irate," insisting

that Brad had tickets for him (T. 46). The saleswoman suggested
that he ask information to contact Brad, who was in charge of
security that night (id.).

Defendant did.

When Brad received

notice that defendant was in the lobby, he sent Chad Stapley to
tell defendant that there were no available tickets and none, to
his knowledge, being released (T. 23-24, 56).
After Stapley told him Brad's message, defendant
returned to the ticket window, now insisting that Laura Russell
left him tickets (T. 47). Again, no tickets were found.

An

employee called Laura, who was home on vacation, and told her
that defendant was insisting she had tickets for him; Laura said
she did not (T. 208-09).

Throughout the encounter, the

saleswoman told defendant that the concert was sold out and
suggested that defendant stand in another line to see if any

8

extra tickets would be released; defendan:
Ins! eviri

defendant ret urned

Despain that "he couldn't; get: ahold
H- - *

there

~vei

:V d

:*x .

'"

) ,

ne tuia

[sic J ot the guy he knew

• njLdn't get him on the ra<

^nd that he just
* re"

i! 11,11

While defendant was inside insisting that he had
tickets i.HI lie !'/, Yi istci and JK.M friend Diane arrived rit 1. lie* D H 1 a
Center but waited outside on a corner, hoping to meet some
frit-- -- .,-• - ,

going

he rrr.rf-i t

4, 239-

i*e

oncert tickets

Kx ii
knee surgeryhand

*u' - '

- "?>

-t'

Despai

-:

.> h^~

umbers since she had

not f
defendant

*„:.<- t : : ^ : ,

•"'- .T- -: pulled his rai to the curb

defendant *•"• ".ucu Krista
about ti.. , ,

,\

"ppf away

'ei e stand i Jiq i i

i < i.« • t i .

Despain stayed i n the cai wi-;ir defendant walked over to
Kiri st a ,2
Defendant asked
for?"

"Il«w inuch ai e y u wuiliny •, uin

l irlkei

(T. 72)
Krista replied: "The-

-

i

Defendant

again asked h^™ mnr'
2

Defendant and Despain claimed that the reason defendant
approached Krista was that it appeared that she was waving the
tickets as if to scalp them,. IT 1 24, 161, 165) . Krista and Diane
denied this and denied that Krista in any fashion offered to se"n
the tickets (T. 72-73, 102-03, 105-06, 241-42, 246-47, 2 5 4 ) .

for sale." (T. 73).
Defendant offered $50 for the tickets.
"No."

Krista said:

(T. 73).
Krista testified that defendant
said that he was with either security or he
was a cop, and that what we were doing was
illegal, and if we didn't sell him the
tickets for $50, we would leave there in
handcuffs or $50, with $50."

T. 74). Defendant then "showed us a badge and did --he put it
away" (id.).
Krista did not know what to say (T. 75). Diane replied
that they were not selling tickets but just standing there to
meet friends (T. 75, 243). When defendant continued to assert
that he would take them to Delta security, Diane said, "Let's go"
(id.).

Krista asked to see defendant's badge again; he quickly

took it out but immediately put it back in his pocket (T. 75-76).
Krista had the tickets in her left hand and her cane in
her right (T. 76). Defendant grabbed the tickets and walked
quickly to his car (T. 77-78, 244-45).

Krista and Diane were

again stunned; they yelled and went after him (id.).

Defendant

got in on the driver's side; Despain was in the passenger seat
(T. 81, 127, 168, 245). Krista stood in front of the car with
her hand held out and yelled "stop" (T. 79-80).

Diane was

pounding on Despain's window (T. 245). Despain asked defendant
what the problem was. Defendant responded that he "asked them
how much for the tickets and they said $50, and he said that he
gave them $50 and took the tickets, and she [Krista] said no, $50
10

apitfH, «1111J [civi eridtiiil, J .'-unl IK W I n't L J M I H J t <"' pny h m

!:L"n .

a p i e c e 'cause t h e y w a s Isic) only $"17 t i c k e t s 01 s o m e t h i n g , a n d
he walked away"
mo VI -1'1 ba ak a f ew ;i nches

I
?'

'""

: .<-.-.• "j-v-ei rav-^i : : •-•

front (id.

Defendant ' .

*. - side; K r i s t a r e m a i n e d in

<- w h e e l s sharply to t h e left a n d
. gh 1 «-i11ci fl A/ I ;:; t e d K r i, s t a ' s

d r o v e of
knee brace, knocking ;,.= r nv.
* - '<

Diane r -

'

her

two IT, 8 1 - 8 3 , 2 4 6 ) .

~ ¥,{ "• "~ ^ — ^

- Vedi more slowly behind
i de 111' I' i.'"11ad S t ap1 e ^",

-

-c«.!;*; - 'fice. Brad F r e c k l e t o n h a d sent t o the lobby to
* ncLcLiiL

i c k e t s w e r e a v a i l a b l e ("J"

, , - „ .^ w ^ r ^ <"\. . *

53-55) .

Police

ayd i.u relat e d what

happened and provided the license number of defendant's car (T.
83

86, 24 6) .
Meanwhilei( defendant and Despam

drove lo the soltbali

game, getting there around 7:30 p.m. when t lie game was half over
)

Defendant cl aimed that he gave Krista's

tickets to his coach's daughter who gave them t
were waiting i n thei r car (T,: 2 6 9 ) .
te:i : , tl ley fom i:i id x IC » i

her parents who

W h e n D e l t a :•---• u r i t y c h e c k e d

the seats I

Defendant was subsequently interviewed by Detecti ve
Kent Bigelow

Defendant admitted that he was at

he had called Brad Freckleton, who said that
he had tickets for him for the Garth Brooks
concert. And he went to get them, could not
locate Mr. Freckleton, fel t Id ke that he was

being jacked around, and left- And saw two
girls standing with one girl holding tickets
in her hand, she had a cane in one hand and
tickets--holding tickets in her hand, and he
said he went up and asked her how much they
were, she said, $50. . . . And he took the
tickets, gave her a $50 bill, took the
tickets, and she says, no, that's $50 apiece.
(T. 226-27).
Other facts will be presented in the body of this brief
as relevant to specific arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's arguments on appeal are founded on a fact
never established in the trial court: Investigator Miller took
notes and tape recorded his interview with Matt Despain.

Since

the trial court never found that such notes or tape recording
existed, it necessarily concluded that no discovery violation had
occurred which justified defendant's mid-trial request to exclude
Miller's testimony or his post-conviction request for new trial.
Defendant has not established that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying him the requested relief or that he
suffered any prejudice by the- denial.
The lack of a factual predicate for defendant's
arguments is especially egregious due to the serious nature of
his allegations.

Defendant charges that Investigator Miller

necessarily lied when he said no tape recording was made, and
accuses the prosecutor of suborning perjury by allowing Miller to
testify that no tape existed.

He makes these allegations despite

his counsel's statements during closing argument that no tape
existed and the prosecutor committed no improprieties.
12

Additional!-, defendant mischaracterizes the record.
.:

Throughout h :i s a/ppc

)i: :i ef,

def endai it a:i : g i ites that: the tri al

court erred in denying :r. 3 motion,, for mi sti iaJ

In fact, hi s

counsel never requested a mistrial, continuance or other similar
remedial meas 1

:L,ioj;i I'lii-l' ,i • • J" ••••

'

ur;iq tri>]. defense counse.

asserted that

received what he characterized ^

v

»'

il.

x*r he had not

inculpatory report

^ T ' s intervi ev c f def ei ise wi tness Despa i 1 1,, Mi ] 1 er t
precluded from, testifying on rebuttal.

The trial court properly

pp'nrn i t led the testimony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
THERE WAS NO BASIS TO JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSION
OF INVESTIGATOR MILLER'S TESTIMONY
A.

Defendant's assumption that Investigator Miller
tape recorded and took notes of the Despain
interview is without adequate record support.

Matt Despain was not, charged or i nvestigated as d codefendant to defendant's ei i me;

he was merely a witness.
defendant was done

Ice::"1 "! av enforcement under \ ;,.
A\r 'r<r\ : Office

direct- ;

\

..; _c~:. . .jnty

•*:.: "TT.mdtr-d

:. ,. j:;e ?

charged
1 September

, 1 -.-

defendant movea

Lake County Attorney's Office due

recuse the * ,

conflict, and sometime

latei : , tiJ:: ,,,€ Utal :i Att :: 1 1 i:ie;y Genera
prosecution (R; 1 9, 2:4-26')
.-.

••:.

-•

A preliminary hearing was scheduled
1 , 3

for October 22, 1992 (R. 19).
Matt Despain, defendant's friend of 20 years, as well
as Krista Warberg and Diane Moulton, had previously been
interviewed during the investigation and those investigative
reports had been supplied to defense counsel (T. 128, 132, 196,
227-229).

To prepare for the preliminary hearing, the newly

assigned state prosecutor wanted to interview Despain in person
(T. 103, 202-03) . He asked Investigator Miller to accompany him

(id*).
The interview took place the day before the preliminary
hearing at Despain's home (T. 129, 212-13).

Investigator Miller

always takes a tape recorder to interviews but does not
necessarily record all interviews3 (T. 219, 222). Although the
tape recorder was observable on the table, Miller testified that
he never turned it on and there was no discussion about taping
the interview (T. 220-21).
E).

See also R. 151 (attached as Addendum

Miller questioned Despain while the prosector took notes for

his preliminary hearing preparation (T. 216).
Despain was subpoenaed but not called by either party
during the preliminary hearing (T. 197).
At trial, Despain was subpoenaed by the State but
testified for the defense - but as defense counsel stated, no

3

Miller testified that he determines whether to record an
interview depending on its nature, e.g. investigative, accusatory
etc. (T. 219).
Miller described this interview as noninvestigative and non-accusatory: he was only there so the
prosecutor could pre-try a witness (T. 213, 219) . See also T.
202-03.
14

matter who subpoenaed Despain, he was always a defense witness
(T. 197, 203). Prior to trial, the defense knew that Miller had
interviewed Despain (T. 203). The only dispute is when defense
counsel learned that Miller might testify: the prosecutor
maintained that he told counsel prior to trial; defense counsel
stated that he learned the first day of trial (T. 197, 203).
When Despain testified, he described what he observed
concerning defendant's encounter with Krista Warberg.

Despain

said he remained in the car, about 30 feet away, facing away from
the location of defendant and Krista (T. 126, 138-39).

He was

anxious "to get going" as they were late for the softball game;
he kept looking at the car clock and "cussing" (T. 127, 139).
Despain testified:
Well, I didn't pay a lot of attention [to the
encounter], but [defendant] went over and
talked to [Krista and Diane] for quite
awhile, and I looked over once--I looked over
several times, but at one point, it appeared
[Krista] had hand--she was handing him the
tickets. I didn't actually see the tickets
exchange their hands, but [defendant] was
pulling his hand back, [Krista] was pulling
her hand back, and he had the tickets in his
hand. She had money in her left hand, he had
the tickets in his hand, and they were
standing there, talking. They talked again
for--the whole exchange probably took ten, 15
minutes. And he stood there and talked to
them for quite awhile, I kept thinking, come
on, let's go.
(T. 126). Despain's testimony that he saw Krista holding money
and defendant holding the tickets corroborated defendant's
version of the theft but was in direct conflict with Krista's and
Diane's testimony that no money was exchanged, defendant just
15

grabbed the tickets from Krista's hands.

This information was

reflected in the various investigative reports provided to the
defense, and was not the subject of Miller's rebuttal testimony.
What was disputed was Despain's further testimony
concerning what he told Investigator Miller about lending the
money to defendant.

During initial direct examination, Despain

testified that he had discussed the incident with several people,
including insurance investigators and police officers (T. 128).
The exchange continued:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you also had a
conversation with [the prosecutor], isn't
that true?
DESPAIN: That's correct.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: He had an investigator with
him?
DESPAIN: Ron Miller.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: What, if anything, did he
say to you?
DESPAIN: He asked me if I'd come to Court, I
hadn't been subpoenaed, I told him I'd rather
not, I've got work to do. I don't like doing
this kind of stuff," it costs me a lot of
money.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: We>ll, he -- that was your
conversation? You-DESPAIN: Yeah, that's what I was saying, I
was saying it to both of them.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: --were telling them you
didn't want to come?
DESPAIN: They're both -DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And-DESPAIN: --asking me questions and recording
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it and I'm not sure exactly which one asked
me which question, but you know.
(T. 128-30).

Defense counsel asked no other questions concerning

the alleged tape recording or note-taking.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Despain
on the details of the loan:
PROSECUTOR: Now, you--on the way there, let's
back up a little bit, you gave money to the
defendant, didn't you?
DESPAIN: That's correct.
PROSECUTOR: And that was some tens and
twenties, or twenties and tens?
DESPAIN: I don't remember the denomination.
PROSECUTOR: It wasn't a $50 bill, was it?
DESPAIN: I don't remember the denomination.
Could have been.
PROSECUTOR: Do you recall telling Ron Miller
that you were certain it wasn't a $50 bill?
DESPAIN: No, I don't recall telling him that.
I recall telling him I didn't remember what
the denominations were.
(T. 137-38) .
On rebuttal, Investigator Miller testified that while
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the prosecutor took notes, Miller did not4 (T. 213, 216, 218-19,
221-22).

His recollection was that Despain said he had given

defendant $50 in tens and twenties, but not a $50 bill as
defendant claimed5 (T. 215-16).
During closing argument, defense counsel extensively
discussed the lack of notes and tape recording.

Defense counsel

argued that Miller had deliberately not recorded Despain's
interview and had failed to take notes so that Miller could
testify without contradiction to its contents (T. 286-87).

While

4

Defendant claims that Miller testified that he had written
down Despain's statements concerning the denomination of the loan
(Br. of App. at 10, referring to T. 222) . The statement, however,
appears to be either a misstatement or inaccurately recorded when
viewed in context.
Miller repeatedly testified that he took no notes of
Despain's responses; he merely doodled on a pad while asking
questions (T. 213, 216, 218-19, 221-22) . Miller did not view
himself as the investigator in the case, but was present as a
safeguard for the prosecutor (T. 213).
Miller's affidavit
submitted in opposition to defendant's motion for new trial also
states that no notes were made by Miller (R. 151). See Addenda C
& E for testimony and affidavit.
Miller was asked on cross-examination if he was testifying
from his memory as to Despain's comments. Miller said "yes" (T.
221-22) .
He was then asked if he thought the denomination
information was written down, "anywhere"; Miller responded that he
believed it was and continued, "it has been written down by me" (T.
222) . Since this is contrary ^to his testimony before and after the
statement and his subsequent affidavit, it is reasonable to assume
that Miller's response was actually that he believed it was written
down by someone (the prosecutor) , but it was not written down by
him.
This interpretation is consistent with defense counsel's
statements during closing argument that Miller deliberately never
made any notes of the interview (T. 286-87).
5

Defendant claims that the only potential disagreement
between Despain and defendant concerning the loan was its
denomination (Br. of App. at 18) . This is incorrect: they also
differed on the amount. Despain said defendant borrowed $50 (T.
137-38, 215-16).
Defendant, on the other hand, asserted that
Despain gave him $60, a $50 bill and a $10 bill (T. 170, 179).
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deriding Miller, defense counsel never implied that Miller had
actually memorialized the interview but was now lying as to its
existence (id.).

Most significantly, defense counsel also took

time to explain that while he and the prosecutor had disagreed
during the trial, the prosecutor had never done anything
"inappropriate" (T. 292).
Despite this factual stance during trial, defendant
argues a entirely different scenario post-conviction.

Following

sentencing, defendant filed a motion for new trial in which he
alleged that Miller had taped the interview and taken notes, had
lied under oath about their existence, and the prosecutor had
knowingly elicited this alleged false testimony (R. 153-54) (a
copy is attached in Addendum D).

In support of his motion,

defendant attached identical affidavits from Matt Despain and his
wife which merely reiterated Despain's trial testimony that the
20 minute interview was recorded and notes taken (R. 132-35)
(attached in Addendum D).

The State responded, again denying

that Miller had a tape recording or notes of the session (R. 14852) (attached in Addendum E).

Defendant did not request an

evidentiary hearing and the motion was denied (Supp. Record,
Order dated Nov. 30, 1993) (attached in Addendum F ) .
The trial court never found that Miller had tape
recorded or taken notes of the Despain interview.

Defendant's

assumption that such documents exist is without adequate record
support.
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B.

Defendant failed to establish a basis to
exclude Investigator Miller's rebuttal
testimony.

Defendant did not claim that the prosecutor had failed
to comply with all discovery requests until after both parties
had rested and the State was preparing to present its rebuttal
evidence (T. 194-96) .
Prior to trial, the State had provided the defense with
a list of witnesses it anticipated presenting in direct rebuttal
to defendant's expected testimony.

The list included Laura

Russell (whose name defendant gave at the ticket window as
holding tickets for him), Detective Kent Bigelow (who as the
investigating officer interviewed defendant prior to charges
being filed), and Diane Moulton (Krista's friend who observed the
encounter) (id.).

The list did not include Investigator Miller6

(T. 196, 203) .
6

While defendant on appeal periodically complains that the
prosecutor failed to include Miller in the list of rebuttal
witnesses, this was not argued below. At trial, defense counsel
referenced Miller's absence from the state's formal list of
witnesses but admitted that he had notice by the first day of trial
that Miller might testify (T. 196-98). Defendant's argument to the
trial court was not that Miller's appearance as a witness was a
surprise but that because Miller "was a potential witness, that the
State should have provided discovery to me, they should have
provided a copy of the--the taped interview, if there was one, or
they should have provided copies of--of summary reports that--that
Mr. Miller may have prepared in preparation for this case or in
preparation for his eventual . . . testimony" (T. 198).
The prosecutor maintained that prior to trial, he had
disclosed Miller's potential witness status in response to his
learning that Despain would testify (T. 203).
In light of defendant's trial statement that he knew that
Miller might testify and his failure to allege that the timing of
the disclosure prejudiced the defense in anyway, this issue is
waived for purposes of appeal. State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920,
922 (Utah App. 1991).
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After the parties had rested and counsel were inchambers discussing the State's rebuttal witnesses which now
included Investigator Miller, defense counsel referred to
Despain's trial testimony that his pre-preliminary hearing
interview was "recorded" (T. 194-97).

However, even at this

stage (prior to Miller testifying), defense counsel recognized
that "there's a dispute about that at this point" (T. 196).
Defense counsel asserted that because Miller was a
rebuttal witness, the defense was entitled to any summaries
Miller made (T. 198). When queried by the court as to
defendant's authority that the prosecutor was obligated to
provide reports of all witness interviews and reports (including
defense and rebuttal witnesses), defense counsel initially
referred to exculpatory discovery cases (T. 198-99).

The court

further questioned defense counsel, opining that no such broad
request was made in defendant's motion for discovery (T. 199201).
D.

See Defendant's Motion for Discovery, attached in Addendum

Defense counsel then abandoned the exculpatory evidence

classification and characterized Miller's alleged tape and notes
of the Despain interview information as inculpatory

investigative

evidence7 (T. 200-01).
The prosecutor responded by explaining the pretrial
non-investigative nature of the interview.

More importantly, the

prosecutor stated that while he took notes, Miller did not nor

7

Defendant maintains this latter position on appeal (Br. of
App. at 17-21).
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did he record the interview (T. 202). The prosecutor related
that he had not turned over his notes as he viewed them as workproduct8 (T. 202-03) . Since Miller had no notes or tapes, the
prosecutor had no memorization of the interview to disclose but
asserted that he had previously told defense counsel that the
interview occurred (id.).

The prosecutor also explained that

Despain had been subpoenaed by the parties several times before
but never testified.

When the prosecutor learned during trial

that Despain was really going to testify, the prosecutor told
counsel there was a possibility that Miller would be rebuttal
witness (T. 203-04) .
The court denied defendant's motion to exclude Miller's
testimony (T. 204) . Defendant asked for no other remedial
measures.
1. Disclosure.
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, prescribes
what materials a prosecutor must disclose upon request.
rule is reproduced at pages 2-3 of this brief).

(The

In response to a

rule 16 discovery request, a prosecutor "either must produce all
of the material requested or must identify explicitly those
portions of the request which respect to which no responsive
material will be provided.
917 (Utah 1987).

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 916-

Further, "when the prosecution agrees to

8

Below, defendant never requested that the prosecutor turn
over his personal notes nor challenge the characterization of these
notes as work-product (T. 202-04). On appeal, no issue is raised
concerning the prosecutor's notes.
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produce any of the material requested, it must continue to
disclose such material on an ongoing basis to the defense."

Id.

at 917.
On the other hand, rule 16 does not require a
prosecutor to disclose unrequested information concerning its
case.9

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) (relying

on State v. Fierst. 692 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1984)).

Nor does a

request for a list of prosecution witnesses require a prosecutor
to "disclose a rebuttal witness whose need could not reasonably
have been anticipated" prior to trial.

State v. Tennyson, 850

P.2d 461, 472 (Utah App. 1993).
Analysis of a claim of improper non-disclosure must
begin with the defendant's motion to discover.

Knight, 734 P.2d

at 916. A trial court's determination of the scope of a
discovery request is a question of law and accorded no deference
on appeal.

Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 472. But the court's

determination that a prosecutor has disclosed requested materials
is a question of fact which must be affirmed on appeal absent
clear error.

See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah

1993) .
Here, the trial court initially questioned whether the
alleged recording/notes of Despain's interview fell within

9

However, "due process requires a prosecutor to disclose even
unrequested information which is or may be exculpatory." Carter,
707 P.2d at 662 (citing State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah
1980)). Defendant does not claim that the information allegedly
withheld is exculpatory; just the opposite, he characterizes
Miller's interview as inculpatory impeachment. See fn. 7,
infra.
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defendant's discovery request (T. 198-99).

The court did not

believe that defendant had requested "any investigative reports"
(T. 200-01).

In fact, defendant had requested "all police

reports and investigations" (R. 22) (Addendum A).

The prosecutor

responded that the interview was done post-investigation and
solely for pre-trial purposes (T. 202-03).

The prosecutor

explained that there were no tape recordings or written summaries
of the interview other than his own pretrial notes (id.).
Further, when he found out that Despain would be testifying, he
provided notice that Miller might testify in rebuttal (T.203).
The court then ruled:
I don't think Rule 16 requires it unless the
cases to which [defense counsel] has
reference do, I don't think they do, but
whether I'm right or wrong, I guess the whole
reason for the brouhaha is that you want his
testimony excluded, and it will not be.
(T. 204). Implicit in the court's ruling is its finding that the
prosecutor properly complied with discovery.

What is unclear is

whether the court concluded that the disputed materials, even if
they existed, did not fall within the scope of requested
discovery (a conclusion of law), or whether it found that the
prosecutor had complied with discovery by disclosing all
requested existing materials (a factual finding).

While the

basis of the court's mid-trial ruling is unclear, the court posttrial implicitly found that Miller's testimony was truthful when
it denied defendant's motion for new trial.

This will be more

fully discussed in Point II of this brief.
But defendant does not attack the lack of specificity
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of the mid-trial ruling.

Instead, defendant's argues that

whatever the basis for the ruling, the State's failure to provide
Miller's alleged tape recording and notes of the Despain
interview 'mislead the defense into believing that no evidence
from the October 17 interview existed and thus built Tueller's
defense around the mistaken belief" (Br. of App. at 16).
For the misleading-the-defense rationale to apply, a
defendant must establish that his discovery request was
sufficiently specific to permit the
prosecution to understand what is sought and

to justify
the parallel
assumption on the
part of the defense that material not
produced does not
exist.
Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (emphasis added).

Even without a clear

trial court determination of the first prong, defendant's
argument entirely fails the second.
Defendant, in essence, argues that the State mislead
him because he believed that Despain could testify without
contradiction to his interview with Investigator Miller and the
prosecutor.

But whether or not Miller tape recorded the

interview or took notes has no bearing on his ability to
independently testify about the

interview.

Prior to trial, the

defense knew the interview had occurred and defendant admits that
at least by the first day of trial, he knew Miller might testify.
Under these circumstances, defendant's argument is
convoluted.

The State's failure to provide documentation of the

interview should have conveyed only one thing to defendant:
Miller did not tape or summarize the interview.
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This was exactly

the State's position at trial.

For the misleading-the-defense

rationale to apply, the opposite would have had to occur.
Miller's documentation would have had to exist but not been
turned over, and the State would have had to then surprise the
defendant with the documentation at trial.

Id.

Further, defendant's assertion that his defense was
built around the mistaken belief that there was no documentation
of the Despain interview belies the facts. Defendant's defense
was not dictated by Despain's pretrial statements; it was defined
by defendant's pretrial admissions to the police and his trial
testimony.
2.

Prejudice.

Even when a discovery violation occurs, the trial court
has the prerogative of determining what remedy, if any, is
necessary.

Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g).

A trial court's denial of

relief is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion; reversal is
only warranted "when taking into account any remedial measures
ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to the defendant still
satisfies the standard for reversible error set forth in Rule 30
[Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure], and the remedial measures
requested but refused would have obviated this prejudice."
Kniaht, 734 P.2d at 918.

"Because of the difficulties posed by

the record's silence in cases involving a wrongful failure to
disclose inculpatory evidence," once a defendant makes "a
credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the
defense, it is up to the State to persuade [the appellate] court
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that there is not reasonable likelihood that absent the error,
the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable for the
defendant."

Id. at 921. Accord Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1243.

In the instant case, defendant has failed to make a
credible argument that the alleged non-disclosure impaired his
defense.

Defendant obviously needed Despain to testify no matter

what Miller would say in rebuttal.
the encounter.

He had no other witness to

Despain's value was not in corroborating the

denomination of the money defendant claimed he gave to Krista,
but in his willingness to corroborate that defendant gave any
money in exchange for the tickets.
Defendant also does not address how documentation of
the interview, if it had existed, would have affected the outcome
of his trial.

State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 276 (Utah 1985)

(defendant must establish the materiality of non-disclosed
evidence).

Documentation of the interview could only have

changed the outcome of the trial if it was exculpatory - - a claim
defendant does not make and cannot prove.10 But it must be
assumed that Despain's testimony would not have changed just
because Miller had inculpatory notes or a tape recording of their
interview.

Certainly, defendant's testimony could not; he was

locked in by his pretrial police interview in which he asserted

10

During trial, Despain testified that he could not now recall
the denominations of the money he gave defendant and thought that
was what he told Miller in the pretrial interview (T. 137-38) . His
post-trial affidavit does not challenge Miller's subsequent
testimony that Despain told him that the money was in tens and
twenties (R. 132) (Addendum D ) .
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that he gave Krista a single $50 bill (T. 227). Thus, if
documentation of the Despain interviewed had existed and had been
provided during discovery, the defense would have known that
Despain could not back up defendant's version of the
denominations of the loan, but would corroborate much of
defendant's other testimony.

If the defense had chosen not to

call either Despain or defendant because of this relatively minor
difference in their testimonies, the defense would have been
weakened, not made stronger.
Most importantly, defendant below never alleged that he
was prejudiced by the claimed non-disclosure or Miller's
potential testimony (T. 196-204).

He had police reports of other

interviews with Despain, knew of the Miller interview, and had
presumptively briefed his witness prior to trial.

Even if

defendant did not know until trial of Despain's claim that the
interview was tape recorded, he should have assumed that either
Miller or the prosecutor may have taken notes. Yet, defendant
never sought to compel discovery prior to trial. Further,
defendant admits that by the first day of trial, he knew that
Miller would testify, yet he Waited until the second day, after
the parties had initially rested, before seeking a remedy.

If

defendant, as he now claims, truly needed more time to gather
information, he was obligated to seek a trial continuance or
recess.

Even more indicative of defendant's lack of diligence is

his failure to move for disclosure of the prosecutor's notes when
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he was told that such notes existed.11

Instead, defendant sat

back until mid-trial and then only sought to exclude Miller's
testimony.12

State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989)

(defendant's failure to ask for a continuance which would have
mitigated a discovery violation constituted waiver of his right
to claim error on appeal); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 88283 (Utah 1988) (defendant waived relief by failing to make timely
efforts to mitigate prejudice caused by discovery violation);
State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981) ("defendant's
failure to exercise reasonable diligence in conducting trial
discovery bears directly upon his claim of surprise"); State v.
Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980) (supreme court is
"unwilling to adopt a rule that permits defense counsel, by
withholding a request for available evidence, to in effect
corrupt a trial and thereby obtain a retrial").

Compare Salt

Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1993) (waiver
for failure to compel discovery does not apply when the
prosecutor's silence mislead the defense to believe that no
criminal record existed when in fact it did).
Despite his failure; to argue prejudice below, defendant
advocates prejudice on appeal.

But he does so without regard to

11

While the prosecutor stated that he did not turn over his
personal notes because he believed they fell in the work-product
exception, defendant never asked the trial court to rule on the
matter (T. 202-204).
12

Contrary to defendant's assertions, he never moved for a
mistrial. The only remedy requested at trial was the exclusion of
Miller's rebuttal testimony (T. 196-204).
Post-conviction,
defendant moved for a new trial (R. 153-54).
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the trial arguments and evidence.

Despain's veracity was not

questioned at trial - only his ability to observe and recall.
The prosecutor never questioned that Despain had given money to
defendant, only defendant's assertion that he gave money to
Krista.

In fact, the prosecutor vouched for Despain's good

character during his closing argument (T. 278, 295).
The jury's assessment of defendant's lack of
credibility did not turn on whether he gave Krista a single $50
bill or tens and twenties.
given.

The jury never believed any money was

They were told that if they believed that Krista had

voluntarily given the tickets to defendant in exchange for $50
but then upped the price (defendant's version of the encounter),
defendant was only guilty of misdemeanor theft (T. 283-85, 28990).

However, if they believed Krista's and Diane's testimony

that defendant intimidated them by claiming he was a police
officer and then forcibly grabbed the tickets, they should find
defendant guilty of felony theft from a person (T. 293) . They
returned the felony verdict.
Even though the jury needed to assess defendant's and
Krista's credibility, they had many witnesses' accounts to aid
their deliberations.

One was Despain; but he was too far away to

hear any of the exchange and only occasionally observed it (T.
126-28, 138-40).

Diane Moulton, on the other hand, could fully

observe defendant and Krista, as well as hear the conversation
(T. 241-47).

The jury also had the testimony of various Delta

Center employees who related the events leading up to defendant's
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encounter with Krista, and Detective Bigelow's account of his
subsequent questioning of defendant.

In each case, defendant's

testimony substantially differed from the witness' statements.
Compare T. 22-25 with T. 157-59, 173, 175, 189; T. 44-51 with T.
160-61, 172-73, 182-83; T. 207-09 with T. 155-56; T. 226-27, 23637 with T. 174, 189.
Any discrepancy in the testimony concerning the
denominations of the loan is minor when viewed in light of the
totality of the evidence introduced at trial.

As such, there is

no basis to conclude that the outcome of the trial would have
been different if Investigator Miller had been precluded from
testifying.

State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989)

(where defendant is not surprised, mislead, or otherwise
prejudiced, any discovery violation is harmless); Schreuder, 712
P.2d at 276 (discovery violation harmless).

But see Knight, 734

P.2d at 922 (discovery violation consisted reversible error).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEPENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED
TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY SUBSTANTIAL ERROR
AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF HIS CASE
At trial, defendant neither characterized Miller's
testimony as false nor asserted prosecutorial misconduct for
presenting that testimony (T. 196-204).

Despite this, defendant

asserted post-conviction in a motion for new trial:
(1) the State had failed to provide Ron
Miller's tape and notes of his interview with
Matt Despain; and,
(2) the State knowingly allowed Miller to
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falsely testify that he had not recorded or
taken notes of the interview.
(R. 153-54)•

Defendant attached two identical affidavits in

support, one from Despain and one from his wife: both asserted
that "they" (the prosecutor and Miller) asked to record the
interview, had recorded the interview, and had taken notes (R.
132, 134). Defendant did not claim that this information
constituted "new evidence" but asserted that the "interest of
justice" required a new trial based on these errors (R. 153)
(copies of the motion and affidavits are attached in Addendum D ) .
In response, the prosecutor submitted a memorandum
outlining the circumstances of the interview and attached an
affidavit from Miller which reiterated his trial testimony and
denied the allegations (R. 148-52) (Addendum E ) .
Defendant did not request an evidentiary hearing and
the court summarily denied the motion (Supp. Record) (Addendum
F).
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a
new trial if a party can establish that "there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect" upon its
rights.

(The rule is reproduced at page 3 of this brief.)
To justify a new trial, newly discovered
evidence should clarify a fact that was
contested and resolved against the movant, or
be sufficiently persuasive that the result of
the trial might be changed. Generally, newly
discovered impeachment evidence does not
ordinarily warrant a new trial.

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988) (citations
omitted).

A failure to provide discovery or discovery of minor
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impeachment evidence, without more, are not sufficient
justifications for a new trial.

Id.; State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d

751, 753 (Utah 1984).
On the other hand, the established use of false
material testimony constitutes grounds for a new trial. Walker
v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981).

The State's use of false

evidence corrupts the "truth seeking function of the trial
process."

Id. at 691.

"Thus, while [a prosecutor] should

prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one."

Id. (footnote omitted).

Because the prohibition against the use of false
testimony is so widely recognized, the trial court's summary
denial of defendant's new trial motion is consistent only with a
finding that Miller testified truthfully.

State v. Ramirez, 817

P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991) (appellate court may presume
findings whenever it "would be reasonable to assume that the
[trial] court made such findings").

It is also supported by the

evidence.
Defendant's attack on the court's ruling is predicated
on a false assumption - that a tape or notes exist. As
previously discussed, Despain testified at trial that he thought
the interview was recorded (T. 130) . Certainly, this is a
natural assumption when a witness observes a tape recorder, and
here, the recorder was on the table.
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But Despain's assertion in

his affidavit that he was asked if the interview could be
recorded and that it was recorded, are in direct conflict with
Miller's testimony and affidavit, as well as the prosecutor's
statements at trial (T. 202, 212-22; R. 151-52).

Rather than

acknowledge this conflict and the trial court's prerogative to
assess credibility, defendant improperly asserts Despain's
statement as established fact.

It is not.

Compare Walker, 624

P.2d at 690 (trial court specifically found that material
information was not disclosed which conveyed a false impression
which the prosecutor knew was false but did not correct), with
Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1244 n.41 (trial court's finding that
witness' testimony was different than earlier testimony did not
establish that testimony was false or prosecution knew it was
false).
The inappropriateness of presenting Despain's
allegation as established fact is compounded by defendant's
insupportable accusation that the prosecutor suborned perjury.
Considering that the same defense counsel asserted at trial that
the prosecutor never acted inappropriately (T. 292), and no new
information has come to light, it is difficult to see how this
accusation can be made in good faith.
Because defendant failed to present a sufficient basis
for a new trial, the trial court properly denied defendant's
request.
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CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, defendant's conviction should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C&U^ day of May, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Janet Miller and James A. Valdez, attorneys for appellant, Salt
Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111, this t*

day of May, 1994.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

DOUGLAS TUELLER,
Defendant

FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Case No. 921009088FS
CAO UNKNOWN
/
COMM. PALACIOS /

COMES NOW the defendant, DOUGLAS TUELLER, through his/her
attorney, JAMES A. VALDEZ, and requests the following material be
provided to him/her as discovery no later than three days prior to
the calendar call presently set for September 15, 1992•
1.

To-wit:

All police reports and investigations concerning the

above-entitled case;
2.

All written or recorded statements of the defendant and

co-defendant(s), if any;
3.

The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal

record including any convictions of any witnesses to be called by
the prosecution;
4.

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

defendant;

00022

6.

All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the

offense for reduced punishment;

7.

All physical evidence taken and all investigative

analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case.
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5)(b), the State
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead
DATED this

gJ

day of September, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for Defendant

^

r-~

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request to the Salt Lake
County Attorneys Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111, this

day of September, 1992

OEUVERED 3\
5.W •afiatojvMr>-<\

000:3

ADDENDUM B

j

MR, VALDEZ:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. VALDEZ:

Or Matt Despain?
Matt Despain was a witness

that—

4

THE COURT:

5

That doesnft have anything

to d o —

6
7

Matt Despain.

I

MR. VALDEZ:

No, thatfs not who they1re

8

going to call, but I think their argument will be that they

9

didn't know whether or not Matt Despain was going to testify

10

or not.

11

for reasons strategic to my case, I seldom call witnesses at

12

a preliminary hearing; however, he was interviewed by

13

investigating officers, he's mentioned in at least one or

14

two of the reports, and I think that the State has had

15

Matt Despain has always been our witness, although

knowledge that Matt Despain would be my witness throughout.

16

In addition to that, I — I see no other reason why they would

17

go and interview him.
Now, we're unclear as to when the State may have

18
19

gone to interview Mr. Despain, and—and people who conducted

20

the interview, I think was Mr. Miller and Mr. Lunnen was

21

present.

22

months ago.

23

terms of discovery information as t o — a s to what he may or

24

may not testify about, as to whether or not he would be a

25

potential witness.

That was conducted, I think at least a couple of
I've never received any—any information in

And in fact, it f s my recollection,
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

although Mr. Lunnen disagrees i s — i s that today is the first,
or yesterday was the first time I found that Ron Miller may
be a witness i n this case.
I think if he was a potential witness, that the
State should have provided discovery to "me, they should have
provided a copy of t h e — t h e taped interview, if there was
one, or they should have provided copies o f — o f

reports t h a t — t h a t Mr. Miller may have prepared in preparation
for this case or in preparation for his e v e n t u a l —
THE COURT:

10

THE COURT:

12

14
15

Well—

MR. VALDEZ:

11

13

any summary

—testimony.
All right.

Now, we heard

all this in chambers, and I'm a s k — I ' m going to ask you a
couple of questions, Mr. Valdez.
Tell me where it i s — w h a t — w h a t

authority you base

16

the proposition on that they should have told you about

17

interviewing—
MR. VALDEZ:

18

THE COURT:

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Brady v s . M a r y l a n d —
—or

excuse me, about

Mr. Miller b e —
MR. VALDEZ:
THE COURT:

—being

MR. VALDEZ:
Knight is the Utah case.

Brady v s . M a r y l a n d —
a witness?

— y o u r Honor, State v.

Rule 16 of the Utah Code of

Criminal Procedure is the d i s c o v e r y —
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THE COURT:

1

You tell me where in Rule—

2

you tell me where in Rule 16, it says that they are obli-

3

gated to tell you that they have interviewed somebody who

4

might be a potential rebuttal witnesses—witness?
MR. VALDEZ:

5

Rule 16—Rule 16 indicates

6

that they have to give me reports of anybody that may have

7

incriminating evidence as against my client or exculpatory—

8

exculpatory evidence concerning my client, and that's—

9

and that—and that has been verified through case law,

10

Brady vs. Maryland and—and the State of Utah vs. Knight—

11

or Knight vs—the State of Utah vs. Knight.

12

And I — i n addition to that, Judge.
THE COURT:

13

Well, I'm not sure those

14

cases hold that, because 16 doesn't say that they have to

15

give you all statements that they have recorded from anybody,
MR. VALDEZ:

16

In addition to that, Judge,

17

my discovery motion, I think specifically asks for any and

18

all witnesses that they may call, and I think it also

19

indicates that—including potential rebuttal witnesses that

20

they may know of, and that's our standard discovery motion.
THE COURT:

21

Well, you know, and again,

22

you can ask—you can ask whatever you want to in pleadings,

23

but if they're not authorised by the law or by the rules,

24

they can be ignored, too.

25

Okay.

All police reports and investigations.
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Any

1
2

written or recorded statement of the defendant and coJ

defendants.

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

3

defendant.

4

t h e — o f the offense for reduced punishment.

5

evidence taken.

6

I

All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of
All physical

All investigative analysis done on any

evidence in the above-entitled case, that's got to mean not

7

the work done as a part of the attorney's work record, but

8

things like lab work and so on, and t h a t ' s — t h a t ' s your

9

request.

10

MR. VALDEZ:

That is.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, tell me

12

w h e r e — w h e r e Mr. Miller's statement fits into that?

13

MR. VALDEZt

14

that may be

inculpa—inculpatory—

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. VALIDEZi

17

It fits into, any evidence

There

isn't—

—it

says any investigative

reports.

18

THE COURTt

First of a l l — f i r s t of all,

19

Mr. Valdez, read y o u r — y o u r — y o u r — y o u r

20

say that.

21

to you.

22

You keep saying it does.

MR. VALDEZ:

request, it doesn't

It doesn't.

I read it

Well, let me tell y o u —

23

let m e , for the record, let me indicate, we're not going to

24

be able to be specific at that time, because we don't know

25

the names of the investigators, Judge.
I

2CK)
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____

THE COURT:
1

t h a t t h a t ' s what i t

W e l l , t h e n , d o n ' t t e l l roe

says.

2
MR. VALDEZ:

Well, I think i t says

that

3
in general,

and f o r —

4
THE COURT:

It

doesn't.

5

MR. VALDEZ:

—and for the record, I

6

would submit it on that.
7

THE COURT:

It doesn't even use the

8

word "inculpatory".

It uses the word "negation", "negate"

9

or to mit—to mean to mitigate.

It doesn't say they have

10

to tell you anything about inculpatory except police
11

reports and investigations.
12

MR. VALDEZ: Any and all police reports
13

and investigations.
14

THE COURT: All police reports and
15

investigations.

All police reports and investigations.

16

That is—doesn't mean you can get anything the attorneys do.
17

MR. VALDEZ:

Well—

18

THE COURT: Any—any more—
19

MR. VALDEZ: —Judge—Judge, I'm not
20

going to back down from my position.

I—you know, 1*11

21

submit it, you rule on it; but I think when I ask for all
22

investigations, that's exactly what it means.
23

THE COURT: Well, I don't.
24

MR. VALDEZ:

Is all investigations,

25
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j

inculpatory or exculpatory*

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. LUNNEN:

Well—
And before you make a ruling,

4

can I just for the record, make a few representations to the

5

Court?

6

THE COURT: Yeah.

7

MR. LUNNEN:

8

First of all, just to—to

J factually clarify how Mr. Miller got involved in this case,

9

and I wish I could give you a specific date, perhaps if we

10

put Mr. Miller on, we can ask him when—if he remembers the

11

date of the interview.

12

I requested, either prior to the preliminary

13

hearing or prior to the first setting of this trial, that

14

Mr. Miller accompany me to do a pretrial interview or a pre-

15

hearing interview, 'cause I had never talked to Matt

16

Despain, and in order to avoid the issue of me becoming a

17

witness in the case, I asked Mr. Miller to come with me,

18

that he would ask the questions and I would take notes. And

19

I did take personal notes, which I do consider work product,

20

and that I did not feel an obligation to provide, nor does

21

Rule 16 require me to provide those notes to the defendant.

22

Mr. Miller did not tape record his interview, and

23

he will represent that on the stand, nor did he take notes.

24
25

I was the only person that took notes. There was no Brady
material generated from this interview, it was a pretrial
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interview, so in that light, there was nothing under Brady
1
that I was required to provide to the defendant, or that I
2
felt wasorequired to be provided to the defendant.
3
And—and my recollection is that—and I don't know
4
when, either, and I wish that I could tell you, that I did
5
6
7

tell defense counsel that Mr. Miller h»d interviewed Matt
Despain.
I will state that Ron Miller is not on our witness

8
9
10
11

list, and the reason why he's not on our witness list is, I
did not intend on calling him to testify unless Matt Despain
was called by the defense.
Now, during the preliminary hearing, he was not

12
13

called or subpoenaed by the defendant.

14

to come for the prelim and then 1 ended up not calling him.

15

Then I subpoenaed him three times, all time—every time this

16

trial vas set, I subpoenaed him and he was not subpoenaed by

17

the defendant, for this trial or any of the previous setting.

18

I asked Mr. Despain

And—
MR. VALDEZ: Well—

19
MR. iUNNEN:

— I had no indication at

20
least—other than there was a handwritten list that was
21
handed to Mr. Castle some time back that indicated that Matt
22
Despain was a witness on their list! but other than that, I
23
had no knowledge that he was going to be called, even for
24
this—this setting.

I subpoenaed.

25
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And when I didn't call

him, then they did call him to the stand, and a t — i t was at
. that time that I decided, and I did let him know prior to
this trial, that it was a possibility that Ron Miller could be
called on rebuttal, this was yesterday! and even at that
point, I didn't know that he would, because Matt Despain had
6

J not taken the stand at that time.

I don l t see anything in

7

Rule 16 that requires disclosure, and I have nothing to

8

disclose, there were no notes, no recordings.
THE COURT;

9

Thank you,

Well, I — I agree.

1 don l t

10

think Rule 16 requires xt unless the cases to which Mr. Valdez

11

has reference do, I don"t think they do, but whether I'm

12

right or wrong, I guess the whole reason for the brouhaha

13

is that you want his testimony excluded, and it will not be.
MR. LUNNEN:

14

And one more matter for

15

clarification, I do see on my notes that Matt Despain was

16

interviewed on October 17th, 1992, at 6il5, that was one day

17

prior to the preliminary hearing.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. LUNNEN:

20
21
22
23
24
25

Okay.
That was the evening before

the prelim.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, does the defense

have further witnesses?
MR, VALDEZt

We have no further witnesses,

Judge, we would rest.
THE COURT:

Very well.
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You may call any

1

present something to the Court on the record?
MR, VALDEZ: Before we broke for recess,

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

just before the lunch hour, Judge, the State had indicated
that they had intended to call four rebuttal witnesses.
Among those witnesses, I think three of them of which I've
received reports about, there's one other witness that—that
I don't recall is on their latest list or not, but that was
Ron Miller.
Ron Miller apparently interviewed, or was present
at an interview with Matt Despain and Matt Despain, as you
recall, had indicated on the stand that—that he thought
that that interview was recorded.

There's a dispute about

that at this point in time.
It's my position, Judge, that when I asked for
discovery, I received reports concerning all the other

16

witnesses that the State has called and the other witnesses

17

that they intend to call, including the three rebuttal

IS

witnesses that they intend to call.

I've never received

19

any reports, any summaries, any notes, anything concerning

20

the interview that may have been conducted by Ron Miller with

21

Matt Despain.

22

Matt Despain has been a witness of mine throughout.

23

First of all, if you'll look at the police reports, you can

24

see that Matt Despain—

25

THE COURT: This Ron Despain?
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ADDENDUM C

1
2
3
4
5
6

Q

I guess for—for resale, or even for your own

purposes, isn't that true?
A

Right.

Q

Okay.

We're not allowed to purchase tickets at all
And I guess that's so that they can avoid

possible problems?
A

Uh huh.

7

MR. VALDEZ:

6

MR. CASTLE: No further questions, your

9

Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down.

10
11

That's all I have.

May this witness be excused?

12

MR. VALDEZ:

No objection,

13

MR. CASTLE:

She may, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: You may be excused.

15
16
17

not remain.

You need

If you wish to, you may, however.
MR. CASTLE: The State's next witness,

your Honor, is Ron Miller.

18

THE COURT: Ron Miller to the stand.

19

Mr. Miller, come forward and be sworn, please.

20

RONALD E. MILLER,

21

called as a rebuttal witness by and on behalf of the State

22

in this matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed

23

the witness stand, and was examined and testified as follows:

24
25

THE COURT: Please take the stand.
State your name, please.
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a

i

THE WTTNESS:

2

, M-i-3-l-e-r.

3

I

THE COURT:

Ronald E. Miller.

Thank you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LUNNEN:
6

g

a
10
..
12
13
14
15

Q

Mr. Miller, would you tell the jury how you're

currently employed?
A

I'm a criminal investigator for the Utah State

I Attorney General's Office.
Q

And would you tell them a little bit about your

I background and experience?
A
officer.

I have approximately 27 years as a law enforcement
I was a Salt Lake City Police Officer for four

years, a Utah State Narcotics officer for four years, I
was a special—
MR. VALDEZ: We'll accept the qualifica-

16
17

tions of Mr. Miller as an investigator for the Attorney

18

General's Office.

19

MR. LUNNEN:

20

THE roURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, again,

21

that means that the qualifications of this officer to testify

22

as a officer, as he's testified he is, have been agreed upon.

23

You need not seek further proof in that regard.
Go ahead.

24
25

Q

(By Mr. Lunnen)

Mr. Miller, do you recall me askingj
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1
2
3
4
5

you to accompany me to a pretrial interview in approximately
October of

f

92?

A

Yes, sir*

I do*

Q

And do you recall who that individual was that was

interviewed?

6

A

It was a witness by the name of Matt Despain.

7

Q

And where was that interview done?

8

A

At his residence*

9

Q

And did you ask the questions, yourself?

10

A

Yes, sir.

11

I conducted the interview and asked

the direct questions of Mr* Despain*

12

Q

And this was done in his home?

13

A

In his residence, yes, sir*

14

Q

Did you take any notes, yourself, of the interview?

15

A

No, sir*

It was a pretrial interview.

I was doing

16

the questioning, but I did not keep any notes as the

17

investigation was already complete.

18
19
20
21
22

Q

Did you make any recording of the interview?

A

No, sir.

Q

What was the nature o f — o f your interview, in

I did not.

general?
A

Kcll, I was questioning Mr. Despain of his obser—

23

observations on an incident that I had reviewed a police

24

report on that had mentioned his name as a witness, and so I

25

interviewed him regarding his observations and his personal
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involvement in that particular: incident,
Q

All right.

Do you recall asking Mr, Despain if—

MR, V&LDEZ-t

I would object to the

leading nature of the questions.
THE COURT: Yeah, itfs going to be a
6

1 leading question, sure as daylight.
Well, yeah, it does.

7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q

Sustained.

It would be.

Go ahead.

(By Mr. Lunnen) Mr. Miller, what did you ask

Mr. Despain about, of the evening of June 6th?
A

I asked him about his involvement in an incident

that had occurred some time prior to that, I think it was
approximately June or July of 1992.

I asked him if he had

met, I think the gentleman's name of Mr. Tueller, and what
his association was with Mr. Tueller on that particular
afternoon and evening, and what he—the conversations he
had with Mr. Tueller, his observations during a trip to the
Delta Center in Salt Lake on Third West, his activities at
that particular location, what he observed.
Q

All right.

Did you ask him about his relationship

with Mr. Tueller?
A

Yes, sir.

I went into the relationship.

I

actually asked him what he did that day and he gave me a
narrative.

He had met Mr. Tueller that afternoon,

Mr. Tueller had come down and asked him if he wanted to go
play softball.

He accompanied Mr. Tueller to play softball.
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1

I asked him what happened at that point.

2

indicated that when they got out in Mr. Tueller 1 s car,

3

Mr. Tueller indicated he had to go to the Delta Center and

4

buy some tickets.

5

Mr. Despain

Enroute to the Delta Center, I believe it was

6

tickets to a — w e l l , it was a country and western singer,

7

I'm n o t — t h e name escapes me at the moment; but enroute

8

there, Mr. Tueller asked him to b o r r o w — i f Mr. Despain would

9

lend Mr. Tueller $50.

10

Mr, T u e l l e r — o r Mr. Despain said he

would, and loaned him $50.

11

Q

12

What questions, if any, did you ask him about this

$5 0 loan that he made to Mr. Tueller, to the defendant?

13

A

14

I asked him the denomination of the bills and I

asked him what he did with the money after he gave it to him.

15

Q

16

Did he tell you what the denominations of the bills

were that h*> gave the defendant?

17

A

Yes, sir.

18

Q

And what was that?

19

A

He indicated that he couldn't remember the exact

20

He did.

denominations, but it was tens and twenties, amounted to $50.

21

Q

All right.

Did you

question him as to whether or

22

not he could have given him any other amount of money?

23

other amount of denomination?

24

MR. VALDE&:

Your Honor, that f s leading.

I f m going to object•

25

I

Any
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1

THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

I'll allow it.

Go ahead.

Well, I asked him if it was

3

o t h e r — a n o t h e r denomination, obviously, if it was a $50 bill.

4

And he had indicated it was tens and twenties.

5

know what combination of tens and twenties, just tens and

6

twenties.

7

MR. LUNNEN:

8

your Honor.

He didn't

I have no other questions,

Thank you.

9

THE COURT:

10

You may cross.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

11

BY MR. VALDE2:

12

Q

Y o u — y o u say you didn't record that statement?

13

A

No, sir.

14

Q

And you accompanied Mr. Lunnen down there, did

15

you not?

As 1 recollect, there was no recording.

Mr. Lunnen here?

16

A

Yes.

I did.

17

Q

And Mr. Lunnen was the one taking notes, I take it?

18

A

He was keeping n o t e s , yes, sir.

19

Q

You didn't take any notes whatsoever?

20

A

I had a pad with m e , I j o t t e d — I was doodling,

21

primarily.

I was concentrating on the sequence of the

22

questioning and the police report.

23

Q

And that was back in October?

24

A

Excuse m e , sir,

25

Q

Back in October?

I
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1

A

Y e s , sir.

2

Q

You're sure it w a s in October?

3

A

That's the time, as I recollect* I keep a diary and

4

It was in October, 1992.

I put down the time and place o f —

5

Q

6

What about the date?

What date in October, do

you remember?

7

A

8

I couldn't tell y o u that, sir, without consulting

my diary.

9

Q

10

And so y o u consulted your diary today, or in the

last couple of days?

11

A

N o , sir.

12

Q

You haven't consulted your diary at all?

13

A

Well, I fill it out daily.

14

I have not.

I did not consult it

o n that date.

15

Q

16

your diary?

17

A

N o , sir.

18

Q

Okay.

19

Concerning this case, have y o u consulted y o u r —

I have not.

And have y o u consulted the notes of anybody

else, including the notes of Mr. Lunnen?

20

A

I reviewed the case with Mr. Lunnen.

W e went over

21

the case and went over the conversation w e had, or I had

22

with Mr. Despain.

23

Q

So y o u d i s c u s s e d — y o u discussed the conversation

24

or the interview that y o u had, with M r . Lunnen when?

25

Yesterday?

I
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Today?

1
2
3

I'm

4
5
6

11
12
13

Q

Well, that's a — w a s it today or yesterday, is what

asking.
A

Yesterday and today, sir.

Q

Okay.

A

So apparently he was looking at his notes

I don't know, sir.

I would imagine he had his

notes, he had the case file.

9
10

I believe yesterday, Mr. Lunnen indicated—

also; is that correct?

7
8

A

Q

So you're not testifying totally from memory, are

A

I'm testifying from memory, as we recollected the

you?

interview after he pretried m e .
Q

I s n ' t — i s n ' t the most accurate way to record a

14

statement is to just simply record it, with an electronic

15

device?

16

A

Yes, sir.

17

Q

And that's because what you get is, you get

18

It is.

exactly what is being said; isn't that correct?

19

A

Yes, sir.

20

Q

And you don't iiave to rely on memory later, you

21

can transcribe that, and you can testify pretty directly as

22

tc what was said?

23
24
25

A

Yes, sir.

Q

In fact, exactly what was said?

A

Yes, sir.
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1

Q

You chose not to do that on this occasion?

2

A

Yes, sir.

3

recording.

4

Q

5
6

Okay.

I chose not to use an oral tape

Mr. Despain indicated that he thought you

had a recorder there, was he mistaken?
I

7

A

In my recollection, he is, sir.

I may have taken a

recorder, but I didn't record the conversation.

8

I

Q

So you think you may have taken a recorder?

9

I

A

I may have.

10

Generally when I go on an interview,

I will take a recorder.

11

Q

12

In fact, that's generally good practice, isn't it?

To take a recorder?

13

A

It all depends on the situation, the interviews,

14

the allegations involved, whether the person's a witness, a

15

suspect or simply a — a n important witness or a periphery

16

witness.

17

Q

Well, what was Mr. Despain at that time?

18

A

Actually, as far as the investigation went, he was

19

merely being pretried by Mr. Lunnen.

20

the investigation.

I was not conducting

2i

Q

But you were asking the questions?

22

A

Yes, sir.

23

Q

Okay.

24
25

And you took along--you may have taken along

a recorder, although it wasn't used?
I

I

MR. LUNNEN:

That's been asked and
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answered, your Honor.
1
THE COURT:

It has.

2
Q

(By Mr. Valdez)

It's your testimony that no

3
recorder was used, although there may have been one there?
4
A

I did not tape record—

5
MR. LUNNEN:

That's been asked and

6
answered—
7
THE WITNESS:

— t h e conversation, sir.

8
MR. LUNNEN:

— a s well.

9
THE COURT:

Yeah, it has.

10
Q

(By Mr. Valdez)

Now, let me ask you this:

Did

11
Mr. Despain ask you not to record the conversation?

Do you

12
recall?
13
A

I don't recall that, sir.

Q

And do you recall if you told Mr. Despain, I'm not

14
15
going to record this conversation, or anything to that
16
effect.
17
A

I don't think that issue was specifically addressed

18
by me, sir.
19
Q

Do you—well, you don't think; do you recall if it

A

I don't recall that that issue was specifically

20
21
22
23
24
25

was?

addressed b y —
Q

Do you recall whether or not you told Mr. Despain

anything about the recorder at all?
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A

Well, to be actually frank with you, I don't

recall discussing a tape recorder.
Q

Okay.

And—but you don't recall if there was a

tape recorder there or not?
A

I — a s I say, as a matter of course, when I go on

an interview, I will usually take a tape recorder just as
7

I simply a back-up.

8

| particular .conversation because of the nature of the interview
Q

Was that so that you couldn't be held to what was

A

No, sir.

Q

And did you ask questions that—that you thought of,

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

I did not intend to record that

said?
Absolutely not.

or were they questions that Mr. Lunnen wanted you to ask?
A

They were my questions.

I'd reviewed the file,

including the police reports, witness statements that were
already in that particular file, antf I had jotted down
questions and reviewed that, and I conducted the question—
I prefer to conduct the .questioning, myself, using my
general chain of questioning for better development of the
answers and the questions.
Q

Let me ask you this:

Did—did you specifically jot

22

down in your diary or any notes that you have in your

23

possession, tens and twenties?

24
25

A

No, sir.

I did not.

Q

So you're testifying from memory in that regard
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1

then; is that correct?

2

A

Yes, sir.

3

Q

A s far as you know, that's not written down,

4
5
6
7

anywhere?
A

I believe it's written down, it has been written

down by roe.
Q

If Mr. Despain was under the impression that his

8

statement w a s recorded, apparently he's mistaken then; is

9

that right?

10

A

Yes, sir.

11

Q

But i t — b u t it's not i n — i t ' s not that there may

12
!3

not have been a recorder there, 'cause there may have been?
A

There could possibly have been a recorder there.

14

As I say, in many interviews I go out with, I will take a

15

recorder.

16
17

Q

Actually, it's in my briefcase all the time.
Now, you also i n d i c a t e d — I take it--were you

designated some sort of investigator in this?

18

A

N o , sir.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

Just accompanied Mr. Lunnen to conduct the interview

21
22
23

You just accompanied Mr. Lunnen then?

of the witness prior to trial.
Q

Before you did that, y o u read some police reports

then, is t h a t — i s n ' t that correct?

24

A

I reviewed the file that Mr. Lunnen had, yes, sir.

25

Q

And there is no question in your mind that
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2

Mr. Despain may have been a witness?

2

A

He was a witness, to my knowledge.

3

Q

All right.

4

MR. VALDEZ:

5

THE COURT:

6

I

That f s all I have.
Anything further?

MR. LUNNEN:

7

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

8

You may step down.

May this witness be excused?

9

MR. VALDEZ:

No objection.

10

MR. LUNNENr

No objection.

U

THE COURT:

12

You may be excused, sir.

You need not remain.

13

MR. LUNNEN:

14

The next witness the State

will call, your Honor, is Kent Bigelow.

15

THE COURT:

16

Kent Bigelow, please.

Mr. Bigelow, come forward and be sworn, sir.

17

KENT BIGELOW,

18

called as a rebuttal witness by and on behalf of the State

19

in this matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed

20

the witness stand, and was examined and testified as follows:

21

THE COURTi

22

Please take the stand.

Please state your name and spell your last.

23

THE WITNESS:

24

My name is Kent Bigelow,

B-i-g-e-1-o-w.

25

THE COURT:

J

You may proceed.
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ADDENDUM D

JAMES A. VALDEZ, 3308
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Telephone:

532-5444

m^r^OURT
DISIR.CM uUUK>
7K!R -

UD >L DTTRiOT ^«^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE T H I R P r ^ D I C I ^
DEPiTi; CL'^K
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

-MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff
v.
DOUGALS TUELLER,

Case No. 921901548FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

Defendant

Defendant by and through his attorney of record, JAMES
A. VALDEZ, moves the Court for a new trial pursuant to Rule
24(a) Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure in the interest of
justice on the grounds that because of error or impropriety
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of
defendant, Douglas Tueller.
Specifically they are:
(1) States failure to disclose through discovery
evidence that the state intended to produce regarding
statements taken from Mathew Despain by state investigator, Ron
Miller, including recorded statements and reports thereto;
(2) The state through its representatives or agents
allowed false testimony by Ron Miller that there was no
recording of his conversation with Mathew Despain and Ann

00153

Despain.

Further, that no notes were taken.
The states representatives were fully aware of such a

recording and notes yet allowed Investigator Miller to testify
that there were none.
(3) None of Mr. Tueller's expunged records should
have been used or considered in rendering a sentence for the
reasons that there was a failure to comply with §77-18-2(4)
Utah Code Ann. as amended in 1992 nor was there ever a Judicial
Order pursuant to §77-18-2(5)(c)(1).
Affidavits to follow.
DATED this

day of May, 1993.

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office
of the County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84111, this

day of May, 1993.
DELIVERED » \
MAY 2*< _
D

&TA0AMR<>

00154

;,1;:T»FC0U*!

JAMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

j,JH. J 4'usP)^®

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

v.
DOUGLAS TUELLER,

Case No. 921901548FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

Defendant-Respondent.
I, MATTHEW DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law
on my oath depose and say:
Regarding the interview that took place on or about October
17, 1992 between myself, Ron Miller, and Rob Lunnen.

I was

interviewed about a case concerning Douglas Tueller.

The interview

lasted about 20 minutes.

I was asked in the beginning if they could

record the interview, at which time they started a tape recorder.
They also took extensive notes to which my wife was a witness.
DATED this

<3

day of June, 1993.

S
<T«r

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this
1993.

r—i-r.b!-T'.VID LOYOLA

iU^So Yuma

day of June,

I

Salt Late City, L'ta>«lC

I — - - -NOTflKr-pUBLTC

/

My Commission Expires:

C0132

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah
this

84114,

day of June, 1993.

C0I33

JAMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DlgTJM
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

v.
Case No. 921901548FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

DOUGLAS TUELLER,
Defendant-Respondent.

I, ANN DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law on
my oath depose and say:
Witnessed the interview that took place on or about October
17, 1992 between my husband, Matthew Despain, Ron Miller, and Rob
Lunnen.

The interview was concerning Douglas Tueller.

The

interview lasted about 20 minutes. My husband was asked in the
beginning if they could record the interview, at which time they
started a tape recorder.
DATED this ? —

They also took extensive notes.
day of June, 1993.

ANN DESPAIN ~ i
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this
1993.

My Commission Expires:

L'c^ry Public
DAVID LOYOLA

o —
{
I

day of June,

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah
this

day of June, 1993.

84114,

ADDENDUM E

:r.s!-j Jtrciiclal District

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
ROBERT C. LUNNEN (4620)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016

JUN 1 7 1993

KI&ZIlLL'i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS TUELLER,
Defendant.

STATE'S
RESPONSE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL

TO

Criminal No. 921901548FS
Judge Richard H. Moffat

The State of Utah by and through Robert C. Lunnen,
Assistant Attorney General responds to Defendant's motion for a new
trial and represents the following in support thereof:
1. The State provided complete and accurate discovery to
defendant. The interview conducted by Ron Miller and Robert Lunnen
was a pre-trial interview necessary for the preparation of Matthew
Despain's testimony at the preliminary hearing.

Although Mr.

Miller was in possession of a tape recorder during Mr. Despain's
interview, no tape recording was made of Mr. Despain's statements.
Mr. Miller truthfully testified that he took no notes during the
interview.

The handwritten notes taken by the prosecution during

this interview are not discoverable.

(See Affidavit of Ronald

Miller attached hereto.)

0014S

2.

The Defendant's expunged records were not used nor

considered by the court to determine defendant's sentence. Records
of the Defendant's expunged convictions were not disclosed to nor
examined by the State.

The State's only knowledge of expunged

records are from defense counsel's oral request that the state not
use expunged convictions for impeachment purposes. The State never
attempted to impeach Defendant's testimony by evidence of prior
convictions.
The State respectfully represents that Defendant's motion
for a new trial is without merit and should be dismissed.

DATED this

day of

y(V**JU

, 1993

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

ROBERT O-fcUNNEN
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Enforcement Division

00149

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
ROBERT C. LUNNEN (4620)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss

I, Ronald E. Miller, being first duly sworn upon oath,
depose and state as follow:
1.

I am a criminal investigator for the Utah Attorney

General's Office, and have been so employed since 1982.
2.

I assisted Assistant Attorney General Rob Lunnen

in a pre-trial interview of Matthew Despain on October 16, 1992,
at approximately 6pm.
the investigation.

I was not the case agent nor involved in

Mr. Lunnen asked that I accompany him as a

witness for his preparation for a preliminary hearing.
3.

The interview as conducted at the residence of

Matthew Despain, and Mr. Lunnen asked that I conduct the
interview while he took notes.

I had a tape recorder with me,

and the tape recorder was on the table.

To the best of my

recollection I did not tape the interview.
4.

I testified at Douglas Tueller's trial that I had

a tape recorder with me during the interview, but that I did not
recall tape recording the interview.

f; 'J U i

5.

I have since conducted a review of the tape

recordings in my possession from past investigations, and have
not located any tape recording of the Despain interview.
DATED this

day of

Zfu f^€—

, 1993.

RONALD E. MILLER
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this /5^4dav of QU*JU
1993

NOTARY PUBLIC

V
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ADDENDUM F

Third Judicial £'.-..:•

/AMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

NOV 3 0 1993
•7
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL'DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

-vDOUGLAS J. TUELLER,
Defendant,

Case No. 921901548FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

BASED UPON Motion of defendant and good cause appearing
therefore;:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for New Trial
is denied in the above-entitled-matter.
DATED this the

day of November, 1993.
BY TEE" Cpl

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the County
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this ______ day of November, 1993.
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